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OF POWER 
Leslie Friedman Goldstein* 
Much of the recent literature about constitutional law is domi-
nated by the debate over interpretivisrn. This essay will stress, how-
ever, a different division: that between scholars who wish to 
minimize judicial discretion and those who would maximize it. 
This division provides a richer analytic breakdown than the textual-
ist versus extratextualist line. Interpretivism (or textualism) per se 
does not answer the question which interpretation of the constitu-
tional text to select. Thus, for instance, the Justice often described 
as the quintessential interpretivist, Justice Black, was no more an 
interpretivist than his frequent foil, Justice Frankfurter. What 
really divided them was a difference of opinion over the degree to 
which judicial discretion ought to be constrained by some expres-
sion of will from a popularly responsive branch of government. 
This difference guided their respective choices of textual interpreta-
tion, most notably in due process cases. 
This essay finds in the constitutional text support for a certain 
kind of political constraint on the Court but implicit rejection of 
other political constraints (such as those advocated recently by 
John Agresto). It also finds, particularly in the overall structure of 
government based on a tripartite separation of powers, textual 
grounds for constraining the Court in terms reminiscent of the old 
political question doctrine, terms frequently defended by Black. In 
short, it argues that the American conception of judicial power as 
separated from legislative power, a conception the Constitution es-
tablishes as law, calls upon the Justices to interpret the Constitution 
in such a way that decisions are textually guided rather than un-
guided. Judges must fill the open-ended clauses of the Constitution 
with principles that are traceable not to a Justice's own vision of 
national ideals but to some expression of the will of the sovereign 
people (i.e., some statute or some aspect of the constitutional text). 
• Professor of Political Science, University of Delaware, Newark. An early version of 
this paper was delivered at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting in April, 1985. 
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THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL POWER 
A specter is haunting contemporary Supreme Court criticism. 
It is the specter of the political question doctrine. The doctrine is as 
old as the Supreme Court's assertion of the power to declare void 
federal laws. "Questions, in their nature political," opined Chief 
Justice Marshall, i.e., that were matters of sheer policy discretion, 
would be decided by those departments of government whose of-
ficers were each "accountable only to his country in his political 
character and to his own conscience." Courts, by contrast, would 
settle questions of law; in fact it was "emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."• Our writ-
ten Constitution indicated by its own words, which prohibited vari-
ous sorts of legislative or executive acts, that it was intended to be a 
law above other laws. Thus it, too, Marshall argued, was appropri-
ately subject to the judicial expounding power. Still, that power 
was a power to expound law, not to invent wholesale. 
This principle, distinguishing the power to interpret laws 
adopted by the people or their agents from the power to make pol-
icy, has been accepted throughout Supreme Court history.2 In the 
Court's earliest post-Marbury effort to explain this distinction,3 Jus-
tice Baldwin explained "the true boundary line between political 
and judicial power and questions": 
A sovereign decides by his own will, which is the supreme law within his own 
boundary; a court, or judge, decides according to the law prescribed by the sover-
eign power, and that law is the rule for judgment .... [A court is always] bound to 
act by known and settled principles of national or municipal jurisprudence, as the 
case requires. 4 
Of course, if this doctrine were fully accurate, judicial review 
I. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170, 166, 177 (1803). 
2. It was reiterated as early as 1814 in Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 
(1814), and explicated at considerable length in the 1838 case of Rhode Island v. Massachu-
setts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838) (from which Taney, who wrote the later, more well-known 
explication of the principle in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) I (1849), dissented). The 
Justices in 1838 were united in the principle but in disagreement as to its application to the 
instant case. See generally 5 S. Cr. DIG. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 68(1) (1967). 
3. Rhode Island, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838). The issues were first set forth in the 
debate in dicta between Justices Iredell and Chase in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 
(1798) (Iredell, J., concurring). The Court announced no consensus on the political question 
doctrine until Marbury. 
4. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 737 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Justice Baldwin's 
reference to "settled principles" of jurisprudence explicitly included the well-established rules 
that governed courts of equity as a matter of judicial custom. He did not intend his remarks 
to preclude common law jurisprudence in the federal courts. 
There is, as well, a second feature that can render an issue a "political question." Even if 
it might be "in its nature" judicially decidable, if the Constitution nonetheless commits au-
thority over it to one of the political branches, the courts are not to decide it. That aspect of 
the doctrine is not a concern of this essay. 
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would pose no problem for democracy. Invalidation of unconstitu-
tional law would be an exertion in aid of, rather than in conflict 
with, the will of the people who adopted the Constitution for them-
selves and their posterity.s The framers' posterity, every time they 
voted to elect officials sworn to uphold the Constitution (article VI, 
section 3), would be renewing the acknowledgment that they did 
indeed consent to its rules.6 And judicial review would simply be 
the application of the will of the sovereign people to the people's 
agents, who had agreed in advance to follow that will. 
Well, this, more or less,? is the tale told by Marbury v. 
Madison.s But hardly anyone buys it anymore. As should have 
been clear since at least the time of Marbury (where Marshall de-
clared unconstitutional part of a statute written and adopted by a 
legislature consisting largely of framers and ratifiers), constitutions, 
statutes, and treaties do not interpret themselves. Reasonable per-
sons may differ as to which interpretation really expresses the will 
of the people. That in itself is not the problem, because that after all 
is why we have judges-to provide authoritative applications of 
generalized rules to specific instances where there is a dispute as to 
their proper application.9 But judicial scholars periodically have 
trouble convincing themselves that the Court is really expounding 
law (i.e., applying preexisting, known principles), rather than sim-
ply making up rules, as would a political body. One crisis of judi-
cial legitimacy or even judicial identity, was triggered by the Dred 
Scott decision; 10 another by the economic substantive due process 
decisions of the early twentieth century. The contemporary judicial 
identity crisis appears to have been set off by Brown v. Board of 
5. See U.S. CONST. preamble. 
6. The argument that voting, where such an oath was constitutionally mandated, did 
amount to consent to the Constitution was frequently put forth by the Garrisonian abolition-
ists, who, believing the Constitution to be proslavery, on that score refused to vote. This 
argument does provide something of an answer to the deprecation by, for example, Alexander 
Bickel and John Ely of the Marbury picture of judicial review as upholding the will of the 
people against actions of the people's mere agents. Cf A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH 16-17 (1962); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 11-12 (1980). 
7. I added the part about implicit consent, through voting, of the heirs of the framers. 
This is also the tale told by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78. 
8. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 176-79. 
9. The fact that judicial interpretation of laws involves a considerable range of discre-
tion (although not one, properly speaking, as wide as that available to lawmakers) was implic-
itly acknowledged as long ago as in Hamilton's The Federalist No. 78 (well before the advent 
of the school of Legal Realism) in his discussion of the duty of a judge faced with ··unjust and 
partial laws'' that nonetheless were not "infractions of the constitution... Judicial power, 
Hamilton argued, would be of benefit "in mitigating the severity, and confining the operation 
of such laws." THE FEDERALIST No. 78 at 528 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
10. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
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Education .11 It has constitutional scholars in a flurry over the ques-
tion, what is the proper role of the Supreme Court in the American 
political system?l2 
PHASE ONE OF THE MODERN CRISIS: BROWN 
AND ITS AFfERMATH 
In response to Brown, Alexander Bickel wrote a much-cited 
article in the 1955 Harvard Law Review 13 in which he demon-
strated, by very thorough historical research, that "section 1 of the 
fourteenth amendment ... carried out ... relatively narrow objec-
tives ... and hence, as originally understood, was meant to apply 
neither to jury service, 14 nor suffrage, nor antimiscegenation stat-
utes, nor segregation."1s He went on to argue, however, that the 
Warren Court was quite justified in refusing to follow the "original 
understanding" of the sovereign people who had written and 
adopted the fourteenth amendment, because those people knew that 
ours was a "broadly worded organic law not [to be] frequently or 
lightly amended." And, operating with this knowledge, the framers 
of the fourteenth amendment had deliberately rejected proposed 
language of a narrow and concrete focus in favor of wording "more 
receptive to 'latitudinarian' construction," in order to put into our 
supreme law language "sufficiently elastic to permit reasonable fu-
ture advances," "a line of growth" in the direction of a higher socie-
tal morality than that for which the citizens of 1868 were ready.16 
Bickel was suggesting that ours is a constitution of aspiration, 
containing moral principles meant to endure but also meant to 
II. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Adkins 
v. Childrens Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 
U.S. 379 (1937); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
12. Lino Graglia, following Alexander Bickel, pinpoints Brown as the beginning of the 
(very activist) judicial era of our time. Graglia, In Defense of Judicial Restraint, in SuPREME 
COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 135, 158-60 (1982). Bickel makes the point in THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 6, at 244 and in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
IDEA OF PROGRESS 7-8 (2d ed. 1978). These scholars are identifying an era of judicial behav-
ior, while I am linking that era to an era of judicial scholarship. In my view the two coincide 
because the Warren and Burger Courts' era of active judicial policymaking produced a 
number of policies pleasing to liberal judicial scholars whose legally trained intellectual con-
sciences nonetheless produced discomfort at the degree to which judges were making rather 
than interpreting law. To cope with this dissonance these legal scholars began to spin out 
new theories justifying, critiquing, and/or explaining what was going on. 
13. Bickel. The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. 
REV. I (1955). 
14. Cf Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
15. Bickel, supra note 13. at 58 (emphasis added). Raoul Berger develops the same 
evidence, but comes to a contrary conclusion about the propriety of the Warren Court's 
decision. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). 
16. Bickel, supra note 13, at 59-64. 
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evolve along with the moral level of the people themselves.11 He 
urged the Justices to take this hope for growth into account when 
they interpreted the document, even to the degree of contravening 
the known purposes of the framers. Is But if the conscious and an-
nounced intent of the law's author could be transgressed by a court 
purporting to interpret that law, what, if anything, remained of the 
idea that courts interpreted and applied the will of the sovereign 
rather than ruling as sovereign themselves? 
Bickel's next three books attempted to answer this question,l9 
as did two very influential articles from the 1959 Harvard Law Re-
view2o by Henry M. Hart21 and Herbert Wechsler.22 Today these 
responses to the dilemma posed by Brown are often misread by an 
anachronistic application to them of terminology developed in the 
heady constitutional climate of the 1980's-terms like "extratextu-
alist" or "noninterpretivist." In fact, all three scholars were at-
tempting to develop criteria to be followed by the courts in their job 
as interpreters of the constitutional text. 
As guides for constitutional interpretation, Herbert Wechsler 
suggested following "the text of the Constitution, when its words 
may be decisive," and giving weight to "history" and "precedent" 
as well. He argued at length that reasoned principles must deter-
mine the relative role of these three in the interpretive task to be 
done. To deny, he insisted, that proper criteria exist to guide the 
Court in its interpretive task would be to render the Court "a naked 
power organ" rather than a court of law.23 
Hart cited Wechsler approvingly.24 When he described the 
Supreme Court as "predestined to be a voice of reason, charged 
17. The Bickelian notion that ours is a constitution of aspiration is developed at some 
length in two recent books. See J. AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY 52-55, 139-67 (1984); S. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 33 
passim (1984). The phrase "open-texture" is from A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CoNSENT 
29-30 ( 1975). See also Hurst, The Role of History, in Supreme Court and Supreme Law 55-60 
(E. Cahn ed. 1954). 
18. "If the fourteenth amendment were a statute, a court might very well [be] fore-
closed from applying it to segregation in public schools. The evidence of congressional pur-
pose is as clear as such evidence is likely to be .... " Bickel, supra note 13, at 59. 
19. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 6; A. BICKEL, THE Mo-
RALITY OF CONSENT, supra note 17; A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF 
PROGRESS, supra note 12. 
20. This was the year following Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I (1958), signed by all nine 
Justices, in which the Court reaffirmed the Brown holding and declared the federal judiciary 
"supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution." /d. at 18. 
21. Hart, The Supreme Court-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 84 (1959). 
22. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. I 
( 1959). 
23. /d. at 12, 16-17. 
24. Hart, supra note 21, at 99 n.34. 
130 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 4:125 
with the creative function of discerning afresh and of articulating 
and developing impersonal and durable principles," he was talking 
about principles for interpreting the law. The rest of the sentence 
that follows reads: "principles of constitutional law and impersonal 
and durable principles for the interpretation of statutes and the res-
olution of difficult issues of decisional law."2s 
Bickel wrote of the Court that in acting upon "its power to 
construe and apply the Constitution" it must ever be mindful of 
constitutional text, history, and precedent, as "sources of inspira-
tion" if not the "wellspring" of judgment. However, he added that 
the Court must also find its reasoned principles in "the evolving 
morality of our tradition" and must prudently refrain from taking 
cases when applying firm, reasoned principles to them would be po-
litically unwise.26 
Another leading work of this period, by Charles L. Black, 
while not denying any of the guidelines of text, precedent, history, 
societal moral tradition, or reasoned principle, added an argument 
for the wisdom and propriety of finding guidance in the plan of our 
overall structure of government. But, again, he proffered this sug-
gestion in order to guide the courts in interpreting "the great vague 
words of the Constitution."21 
Thus, the battle among the Court's critics in the post-Brown 
decade2s took place over the terrain of whether the Court was fol-
lowing the proper guidelines in doing its job of interpreting the 
more malleable phrases of the Constitution-those phrases like 
"due process" and "equal protection" that had been, as it were, in-
tended by the framers to take on unintended meaning as society 
evolved. Those parts of the constitutional text were intended by the 
25. /d. at 99 (footnote omitted). 
26. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 6, at 235 passim, 113-98. 
See A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT, to the effect that the Court's obligation "to 
give us principle," bounded by the need that it be rigorously reasoned and that the Justices 
consider both "history and changing circumstances," originates in "the Constitution as the 
Framers wrote it." THE MoRALITY OF CoNSENT, supra note 17, at 25-30. See also The 
Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress, which clarifies that Bickel's references to the Court's 
use of the method of "moral philosophy" was an effort to describe an approach to constitu-
tional interpretation: "The justification must be that constitutional judgment turns on issues 
of moral philosophy"-i.e., "the method of reason familiar to the discourse of moral philoso-
phy, and in constitutional adjudication, the place only for that" (as specifically contrasted to 
policy preferences of either the Justices or of the public). THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 12, at 86-87 (emphasis added). 
2i. C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 
48 (1960) (the preface, dated 1959, establishes this work as contemporaneous with the Hart 
and Wechsler pieces). 
28. Another influential work of this period was Gerald Gunther's critique of Bickel. 
Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency 
in Judicial Review, 64 Cot.UM. L. REv. I (1964). 
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framers to evolve and grow in meaning as society developed, and to 
grow in ways that simply could not be foreseen, or in any literal 
sense planned upon, in advance.29 
PHASE TWO OF THE CRISIS: GRISWOLD v. 
CONNECTICUT AND ITS AFTERMATH 
The Court itself removed the main battlefield to a new plateau 
in 1965. In Griswold the Supreme Court reasserted the long-
discredited doctrine of "substantive due process" to protect a right 
of "marital privacy," nowhere mentioned in the Constitution.3o No 
member of the majority except Justice Harlan3I admitted that the 
doctrine of substantive due process was being resurrected, but the 
dissent32 so identified it. Later, Justice Stewart, who had switched 
from dissent to concurrence,33 as well as most of the original Gris-
wold majority,34 acknowledged the resurrection of the doctrine of 
substantive due process. 
This doctrine had been discredited on a variety of grounds, but 
the criticism of interest here would go as follows: Substantive due 
process reads the due process clause as licensing judges to decide 
what rights are fundamental in America. If they believe the rights 
to be of fundamental importance in our society (i.e., in the good 
society), even if the Constitution neither mentions them nor alludes 
to them, the courts may so announce.3s Once they have pro-
29. The open acknowledgment that the Supreme Court sometimes defies the conscious, 
specific intent of the authors of the law that the Court purports to be interpreting stimulated, 
as well, a wave of secondary skirmishes over how active the Court ought to be in affecting 
public policy. This issue, the "activism" versus "restraint" controversy, although important, 
is secondary in the sense that it addresses not what the Court ought to be doing but when, or 
how often, the Court ought to do it. It is, for that reason, not the focus of this essay. 
30. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
31. Harlan rested his Griswold concurrence, 381 U.S. at 499, in large part on his dissent 
in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539-55. There, he argued that the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment embraced all of the fundamental (unwritten) rights that article IV, 
section 2, "privileges or immunities of citizens" clause had protected for persons who change 
state residency. (He offers no explanation why, within the fourteenth amendment, it is the 
due process rather than the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" clause 
that gives this protection.) Harlan specifically insisted that to limit the due process clause to 
procedural matters would be a foolishly "extreme instance of sacrificing substance to form," 
id. at 551. The Griswold concurrences of Justice Goldberg (with Chief Justice Warren and 
Justice Brennan), 381 U.S. at 486, and Justice White, 381 U.S. at 502, can be read as implying 
an endorsement of substantive due process. Thus, five Justices at least implicitly endorsed it. 
32. Griswold, 381 U.S., at 507 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167-68 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). See also Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) where Justice Stewart switched to the side he had opposed 
in Griswold. 
34. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53. 
35. I reserve the phrase "substantive due process" for the creation by the Court of 
unwritten fundamental rights, even though one could argue that the Court had long been 
using that doctrine for the "written" rights (both express and implied) of the first amend-
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nounced a particular right "fundamental," the electorally respon-
sive branches of government may not (absent compelling exigency) 
abridge it. So-called substantive due process turns the Justices from 
interpreters of a legal text, albeit an opaque, plastic one, into Grand 
Prohibitors who may overturn any law that strikes them as very 
bad. Through substantive due process the Court can directly legis-
late rights. The Justices do not have to "derive" them from any 
expression of the sovereign will. The distinction put forth in the 
original political question doctrine disappears, and Americans wind 
up, on various topics, ruled by nine persons appointed for life who 
are more or less immune to the influence of majority sentiment. 
This reclaiming of judicial power via the resurrection of sub-
stantive due process thus radicalized the tension that had always 
existed between judicial review and democracy. Constitutionalism 
itself expresses a desire by "the people" (embodied in the hyper-
majority needed for constitutional ratification and amendment) to 
restrain themselves (in the form of future legislative majorities) by 
basic principles deemed worthy of enduring until a new hyper-
majority wills a change.36 Constitutionalism could, in theory, be 
maintained by having popularly elected officials enforce upon them-
selves the enduring principles. Such a system would be more demo-
cratic, in the sense of majoritarian, but the principles are more 
likely to be effective restraints on officials if they are enforced by an 
aloof, disinterested body (such as a non-elected, life-tenure court). 
To the extent courts and elected officials have conflicting but legiti-
mate interpretations of those enduring principles, there exists an in-
evitable tension between judicial review and democracy. But still, 
that degree of tension is arguably a worthy price for an effectively 
constitutional democracy. Substantive due process eliminates, how-
ever, any claim that the Justices are merely interpreting the will of 
the people. 
These implications were apparent in 1965, but few Americans 
cared to oppose the idea that persons who wanted to use contracep-
tive devices should be allowed to; Griswold went more or less unno-
ment. I would argue that the application of first amendment rights against state governments 
is legitimate not as a matter of "substantive due process" but either because those are cer-
tainly "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" or because these are rights 
essential to a democratic lawmaking process and thus are "due" to Americans as procedural 
"due process." The merger of these two arguments is a central theme in J. ELY, supra note 6. 
36. The idea that constitutionalism expresses a will by the majority for self-restraint 
appears in the work of a number of judicial scholars. See, e.g., J. AGRESTO, supra note 17, at 
52-55; A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CoNSENT, supra note 17, ch. I; C. BLACK, supra note 
27, at 105-09, 117-19, 178-82; L. TRIBE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT 9-11 (1978). 
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ticed.37 After 1973, however, when Roe extended Griswold's logic, 
pandemonium broke loose in judicial scholarship. No longer was 
the Court legislating at the margins against curious, outdated, and 
nationally unpopular state laws; now it was legislating in bold and 
broad strokes, dramatically shaping the life of the nation. And it 
was doing so in its Grand Prohibitor mode, with no apparent em-
barrassment at the absence of any textual basis in the constitutional 
text for its assertion that there is a fundamental right to choose to 
have an abortion.Js The Justices were very obviously doing some-
thing other than interpreting law, and they were doing it in ways 
that had tremendous societal impact. Scholars began to line up on 
either side of this new development. 
CURRENT DIVISIONS IN JUDICIAL SCHOLARSHIP 
A number of scholars, of course, reacted against this new de-
velopment. John Ely39 produced the most impressive of the criti-
cisms along traditional lines. Raoul Berger took up the outpost at 
the furthest extreme opposing the new trend, insisting that the only 
legitimate role for judges is to follow the exact and specific intent of 
the framers, where such intent is discoverable, so that even Brown 
was for him an illegitimate use of judicial power.40 
But surprisingly many scholars support the Court's new power 
to create unwritten rights. Thomas Grey has argued that the de-
fense of "extratextual" rights by judges has a respectable but rela-
tively neglected history in America, and that it is therefore 
thoroughly appropriate for Justices to announce and enforce as law 
their perception of our national ideals.4 I Walter Murphy has essen-
37. Besides, Griswold was concurred in by Justice Harlan, widely known as an oppo-
nent of "judicial activism," and since many scholars were busying themselves with the activ-
ism versus restraint question, they did not give Griswold much heed. (As should by now be 
clear, the concern of this essay is not the degree of influence over public policy by the judges, 
but rather the source of judicial authority and the degree of discretion in that authority.) 
38. Not one of the Justices who currently opposes the idea that there is a constitutional 
right to seek an abortion wishes to abandon the doctrine that the due process clause licenses 
judges to decide which rights are fundamental for Americans. See Akron v. Akron Center 
for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (O'Connor, J., with White and Rehnquist, J.J., 
dissenting). These Justices do not deny there is a fundamental right under the fourteenth 
amendment to privacy in reproductive matters; they simply argue that state concerns for 
protecting fetal life should be viewed as compelling enough to override the fundamental right. 
/d. at 459-61. Thus, they would continue to protect the Court's (i.e., their own) power to 
declare other unwritten rights fundamental. 
39. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 
(1973). 
40. R. BERGER, supra note 15. 
41. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); Grey, 
Origins of the Unwritten Constitution, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843 (1978). 
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tially seconded that argument.42 
Michael Perry defends judicial enforcement of values "not con-
stitutionalized by the Framers" on the grounds that such exercise of 
"noninterpretive" judicial review will benefit our polity. Noninter-
pretive review, he argues, is not dangerous because it is limitable by 
the jurisdiction-denying power of our electorally accountable 
Congress. 43 
Similarly, Laurence Tribe« and Philip Bobbitt4s defend the 
creation of unwritten rights by the Court on the following grounds: 
(1) that the Constitution endorses limited government; (2) that this 
concept implies that certain intimate aspects of human life are off 
limits to the government; and (3) that judges should elucidate those 
limits when legislators fail to acknowledge them. And Arthur S. 
Miller has argued for open abandonment of the supposed pretense 
that the Constitution operates or has operated in any meaningful 
way as written law. Rather, it has been from the start merely an 
"empty vessel" into which judges poured their own values. He has 
urged that we drop the charade, avoid appointing lawyers to the 
Supreme Court (for they are victims of the "legalized brain dam-
age" of a law school education) and appoint instead persons re-
nowned for ethical wisdom who would act as our "Council of 
Elders" throwing out any laws that conflict with "the Good."46 
These scholars are in no sense at all an extremist fringe of judicial 
studies; they are among its most respected figures, professors at 
leading law schools, producers of books for Harvard, Yale, and Ox-
ford Press. The bandwagon of noninterpretive, or extratextual, ju-
dicial review, seems to be displaying unstoppable momentum.47 
Indeed, even as he wrote a masterful book attempting to con-
strain it,4s John Ely provided (or acknowledged) very important 
42. Murphy, The Art of Constitutional Interpretation: A Preliminary Showing, in Es-
SAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 130, 135-47, 155-59 (M. Harmon, ed. 
1978). 
43. M. PERRY, THE CoNSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 93 (1982) 
(especially chapter four). 
44. L. TRIBE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 893, ch. 
15 (1978). 
45. P. BoBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) (es-
pecially chapters seven through twelve). 
46. A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JuDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 24 (1982). For a highly theoretically sophisticated variant of the 
"empty vessel" approach, see L. CARTER, CoNTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LA WMAK-
ING: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ART OF POLITICS (1985), or any of the constitutional 
scholarship of the self-designated Critical Legal Studies movement. 
47. With the possible exception of Miller, this group that I have called extratextualists 
would fit the category that William Harris dubs "transcendent structuralist." Harris, Bonding 
Word and Polity, 16 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 34, 41 (1982). 
48. J. ELY, supra note 6. 
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ammunition for the noninterpretivist argument. The text itself, Ely 
argued, mandates extratextual rights. The textual passages that do 
this-that acknowledge an unspecified body of substantive rights 
that all government officials, including judges, are expected to 
honor-are, according to Ely, the ninth amendment and the privi-
leges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
I find Ely's discussion of the ninth amendment quite uncon-
vincing. The most direct reading of the language and the sparse 
legislative history of the amendment4 9 seem to me to support the 
traditional view of its meaning. It functions merely as a warning 
not to read the existence of a bill of rights as a derogation of the 
idea that the federal government is one of enumerated rather than 
plenary powers. 
On the other hand, there seems no denying (the Slaughter-
House Cases so to the contrary notwithstanding) that the privileges 
or immunities clause creates a constitutional shield around the sub-
stantive fundamental rights of American citizenship.s1 If it is the 
Supreme Court's job to interpret the legal text, including that 
clause, it would indeed seem that the people of the United States in 
1868 authorized the Supreme Courts2 to identify those rights that 
were fundamental enough to rank as "privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States." Thus, this essay's argument seems to 
have moved in a circle: textualism appears to point to extratextual-
ism. Or to put it another way, perhaps the privileges or immunities 
clause of the fourteenth amendment did away with the legal ques-
tion/political question distinction for cases involving state govern-
ments (the government level where the vast majority of 
controversial decisions arise). 
There are some scholars who try to avoid this dilemma by fol-
lowing Raoul Berger in assigning to the privileges or immunities 
clause a meaning so narrow that it merely duplicates the due pro-
cess and equal protection clauses of the same amendment.s3 That 
49. Compare id. at 34-41 with Perry's critique supra note 43, at 22-24. 
50. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
51. Perry, following Raoul Berger, attempts the denial, supra note 43, at 23, 61-75, but 
his denial ignores the deliberate choice of open-ended language for the provision and the very 
open-ended description of the concept of "privileges or immunities of citizenship" in the 
leading federal case at the time, Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 
3230). Justice Harlan's classic defense of substantive due process in his Poe v. Ullman dissent 
anticipated Ely's privileges or immunities clause argument by quoting directly from Cornfield 
to explain what "substantive due process" protects. In fact, Harlan in that dissent at least 
implicitly suggests most of the arguments later developed by extratextualist scholars. See 367 
U.S. at 539-45. 
52. At least, that is, as a back-up mechanism for failures of omission by Congress; see 
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. 
53. Compare R. BERGER, supra note 15, with M. PERRY, supra note 43, at 61-62. 
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reading, however, certainly does not come from the words. Nor 
does it follow the meaning assigned in the earliest case interpreting 
the clause.s4 And it is a meaning disfavored by at least two com-
mon guides to constitutional construction: First, if possible, words 
of the Constitution ought to be assumed to have a meaning, a raison 
d'etre. Second, any deliberate choice by the framers (including a 
choice for open-ended as against precise and narrow language) 
ought not to be ignored. 
Thus, the interpretivist/noninterpretivist (or textualist/ex-
tratextualist) distinction is not a tenable basis on which to condemn 
the Court's unwritten fundamental-rights jurisprudence. What the 
Court purports to do under the banner of substantive due process 
(aided or not by the ninth amendment), it could reasonably claim it 
was entitled to do under a not particularly strained interpretation of 
the privileges or immunities clause. So Ely moves beyond the textu-
alist debate, to look for appropriate constraints upon judicial power; 
he finds these in the intent of the constitutional text to establish a 
representative, democratic political process. 
IN DEFENSE OF (YET ANOTHER) NEW TYPOLOGY 
My task here is not to elaborate or critique Ely's argument. It 
is rather to suggest that the goal of constraining judicial power by 
some expression of the sovereign popular wmss is a worthy goal. It 
has roots as deep as the political question versus the legal question 
doctrine; it is a goal that goes further than the term "textualist" 
toward explaining the much-discussed jurisprudence of Justice 
Black; and it is a goal that deserves attention because policymaking 
by life-tenured judges really is somewhat undemocratic. 
I am suggesting here a reconceptualization of judicial scholar-
ship. I would replace the textualist/extratextualist categorization 
with a continuum that focuses upon the degree of constraint that a 
particular jurist imposes on judicial power. This is not to be 
equated to the old judicial activism versus self-restraint conception. 
That focused on the degree of judicial impact upon public policy. 
Justice Black, for instance, was no self-restraintist; he was 
happy for Court decisions to have a enormous influence upon public 
policy. But he wanted judicial flexibility constrained by the words 
adopted by the people in the Bill of Rights. 56 Justices Frankfurter 
54. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 394 (1873). I disagree with the Court's reading 
of the clause in that decision, as well. 
55. In Ely's case, an expression he finds in the structure of government established by 
the constitutional text and the political process it implies. 
56. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-70 (Black, J., dissenting) (1947). 
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and Cardozo read the text of the fourteenth amendment as auth-
orizing judges to decide which procedural rights for accused 
criminals were "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"57 or were 
required by "immutable principles of justice."ss Justice Black con-
demned this reading because it "subtly convey[ed] to courts, at the 
expense of legislatures, ultimate power over public policies in fields 
where no specific provision of the Constitution limits legislative 
power"; and it could "be used ... to license this Court ... to roam 
at large in the broad expanses of policy and morals and to trespass, 
all too freely, on the legislative domain."s9 
Although less of a constraintist than Black when interpreting 
the due process clause, Frankfurter, too, felt that some constraints 
on the range of judicial discretion were needed. His choice when 
confronted with the truly open-ended privileges or immunities 
clause was far more drastic than that of Justice Black, who would 
have constrained its reach by the Bill of Rights. Justice 
Frankfurter, as did Justice Miller long before him,60 when faced 
with the awesome degree of latitude conferred by the clause, chose 
simply to shut his eyes, to see no conferral of any power or any 
other meaning in the clause.6I 
57. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
58. Adamson, 322 U.S. at 60 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
59. Adamson, 322 U.S. at 75, 90 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black was making a 
dual argument: (I) that the historic intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment was 
compatible with his, and not Frankfurter's reading; and (2) that Justice Frankfurter's reading 
would have the bad institutional consequence of producing limitless judicial power. When his 
historical argument was persuasively challenged, he did not abandon his interpretation. See 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring); Rochin v. California, 
342 U.S. 165, 174-77 (1952) (Black, J., concurring); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949). 
60. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 394 (1873). 
61. "I put to one side the Privileges or Immunities Clause of that Amendment. For the 
mischievous uses to which that clause would lend itself if its scope were not confined to that 
given by ... the Slaughter House Cases, ... see the deviation in Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 
404, overruled by Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83." Adamson, 332 U.S. at 61-62 (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
In my own opinion, the Colgate reasoning on the privileges or immunities clause is much 
more impressive than that in Madden. But it is probably useful to note the dissent in Colgate 
by Justice Stone (with Justices Brandeis and Cardozo): 
The reason for this reluctance to enlarge the scope of the [privileges or immu-
nities] clause ... [beyond the Slaughter House view that it did no] more than dupli-
cate the protection of ... other provisions of the Constitution, [is that] [i]t would 
enlarge judicial control of state action and multiply restrictions upon it to an extent 
difficult to define, but sufficient to cause serious apprehension .... 
Colgate, 296 U.S. at 445 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
Similarly the Slaughter-House Cases shied away from allowing the language of the privi-
leges or immunities clause to carry any real meaning. Justice Miller, writing for the Court, 
explained that to take the words at face value would be to "constitute this court a perpetual 
censor upon all legislation of the states, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with author-
ity to nullify such as it did not approve." Slaughter-House 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 409. So, 
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A constraint-minimizer to constraint-maximizer scale of jurists 
might look suspiciously like a "clause-bound interpretivist."62 The 
difference, however, is significant. Frankfurter, no less than Black, 
was an interpretivist. But the latter chose interpretations more con-
straining of judicial discretion, because of his views on the appropri-
ate relation between a democratic polity and its life-tenured judges 
(i.e., because of his political theory). 
Compared to extremists of the Raoul Berger variety, Justice 
Black as well as Justice Frankfurter, like John Ely, would fall some-
where in the middle range on a judicial constraint scale-they were 
judicial discretion, or judicial constraint, optimizers. Those schol-
ars, like Raoul Berger, who try to confine Justices by the specific, 
conscious original intent of the framers would fit at the extreme, 
constraint-maximizing (or discretion-minimizing) end of the scale. 
And the self-proclaimed noninterpretivists, such as Thomas Grey63 
or Arthur Miller64 would appear at the constraint-minimizing (or 
discretion-maximizing) extreme of the scale. 
At this point, moreover, the degree-of-constraint scale would 
be useful in highlighting differences among noninterpretivists. 
Noninterpretivist Michael Perry builds into the judicial role some 
traditional nontextual constraints, such as the rule that judges' 
opinions ought to be rationally justified by neutral and general prin-
ciples. 65 By contrast, noninterpretivist Arthur Miller66 rejects even 
these traditional judicial-role constraints, wanting total discretion 
for a lifetime-appointed Council of Elders. 
The purpose here is not to introduce yet another category of 
jargon (constraint-maximizer, discretion-minimizer) into American 
jurisprudence-far from it. But it is to argue that the dispute over 
the degree to which judges' opinions are guided by textual or 
nontextual considerations is to a certain degree beside the point. 
The question over which judicial-constraintists and judicial-
discretionists are most fundamentally divided is the very question 
that animated John Marshall's political question doctrine: To what 
instead, the Court read the clause as securing only those rights created by the relation be-
tween the citizen and the federal government, rights that predated the fourteenth amendment 
and that were already enforced by the supremacy clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI, sec. 2. See 
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1868), cited in Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 409, 
which predated the fourteenth amendment. See also discussion in J. ELY, supra note 6, at 22-
30, 193-200. 
62. The term is from J. ELY, supra note 6, ch. 2. 
63. Grey, supra note 41. 
64. A. MILLER, supra note 46. 
65. M. PERRY, supra note 43, at 25-27. 
66. A. MILLER, supra note 46. 
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degree should judges' power be hemmed in by some expression of 
the will of the people? 
Thus, after Ely exposed the weaknesses of textualism per se as 
a constraint, certain scholars sought out constraints elsewhere. 
Michael Perry found some (as just described) in the traditional con-
cept of "judicial" power itself, which is in a sense traceable to the 
text of article III, but he also found some constraints in the power 
of our elective Congress to make exceptions to federal court juris-
diction. He devoted a good deal of attention to defending the ap-
propriateness of using this legislative power as a check on judicial 
power.67 
In the same vein, a recent book by John Agresto defends addi-
tional checks by the political branches. Beyond Congress's jurisdic-
tion-limiting powers, Agresto (taking pages from the histories of 
Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt) insists on the legitimacy 
of outright defiance by Congress of Supreme Court readings of the 
Constitution.6s According to Agresto, Congress has just as much 
right to read the Constitution its way as the Supreme Court has to 
prefer its own version. Thus, it is perfectly legitimate for Congress 
to pass laws that directly and intentionally defy the Supreme 
Court's view of constitutionallaw.69 Lincoln came up with this the-
ory when faced with the extreme crisis of the Dred Scott decision. 
But he limited it to those constitutional positions that had not yet 
taken firm root in judicial doctrine, that had not been "fully set-
tled," that had not been "affirmed and re-affirmed through a course 
of years." For those rules that had been repeatedly reaffirmed by 
the Court, Lincoln, at least, felt that they should control "the gen-
67. M. PERRY, supra note 43, at 126-45. 
68. J. AGRESTO, supra note 17, at 96-138. 
Defiance, that is, of the rules of law pronounced by the Court. Like Lincoln, Agresto 
would insist that the executive and legislative branches must cooperate in imposing the 
Court-ordered particular result on the specifically involved litigants. In addition to the 
examples of Lincoln and Roosevelt, Agresto is also very much influenced by the judicial 
history of federal civil rights laws. See. e.g., J. AGRESTO, supra note 17, at 126-27; Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of 
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
69. Agresto characterizes this not as defiance but as a power "to force reconsideration" 
by the Court, a power "repeatedly to call for reexamination and reconsideration... J. 
AGRESTO, supra note 17, at 126, 130. Eventually. one presumes, the Supreme Court would 
get to decide again upon a law that Congress had repassed after it had been declared void, 
but, in the meantime, much mischief could be done-for example, innocent people might 
spend years in jail. Agresto does not view the matter from that angle because he has in mind 
judicial mischief--errors of interpretation by the Supreme Court that need correcting. Still, 
to the degree that his view became accepted, congressional flouting of Supreme Court reason-
ing would be understood as legitimate and normal day-to-day behavior (rather than as a 
response to an extreme crisis, as it was with the Dred Scott decision and the Great Depres-
sion.) It is very difficult to imagine that this would not undermine the general respect for law 
in America. 
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eral policy of the country, subject to be disturbed only by amend-
ments of the Constitution. "7o Agresto pointedly refrains from 
endorsing Lincoln's limit on the Congressional power of defiance.7t 
Thus, Agresto takes on the calculated risk of loosening the 
bonds of law in order to promote effective checks on judicial power. 
What I would describe as a somewhat dangerous unleashing of a 
spirit of lawlessness, he would defend as in keeping with the overall 
scheme of the American constitutional structure, namely one of 
checked power where no one branch is trusted to go unchecked by 
the others. 
WHAT CAN THE CONSTITUTION CONTRIBUTE? 
At this point it may be useful to examine the structure of the 
Constitution for light that it may shed on the matter of appropriate 
constraints on judicial power. The Constitution does create a pretty 
clear hierarchy of authority. At its peak is the procedural hyper-
majority that counts as "the people" for Constitution-making pur-
poses. This group-for amending and ratifying purposes, most 
commonly those people represented by two-thirds of each house of 
Congress and then by majorities in both houses of three-fourths of 
the states-is extremely difficult to mobilize. Thus a very extreme 
degree of gradualism was initially imposed on the process by which 
our fundamental law is to be reformed. 
From the hyper-majority comes the written rules that are to 
govern the lawmaking majority, which then produces the statutes 
and regulations that govern individual citizens. The lawmaking 
majority, of course, is not a simple majority; it results from varieties 
of ways of counting majorities, first in staggered and districted elec-
tion systems, then in two separate legislative houses, and then by an 
overrideable (by a two-house hypermajority) executive veto. Thus, 
further gradualism was built into the lawmaking process. 
The enforcement of the Constitution-the fundamental rules 
of the hyper-majority (the people)-upon the lawmaking majority 
was entrusted, at least implicitly, to the federal courts. They are 
authorized (article III, section 2, clause 1) to decide cases "arising 
under the Constitution" and are told to treat as supreme law those 
federal laws that are in fact "in pursuance" of the Constitution (ar-
ticle VI, section 2). 
From Madison's notes on the Constitutional Convention, we 
know two facts about judicial review. First, we know that most of 
70. A. LINCOLN, Speech at Springfield, June 26. 1857. in COLLECTED WORKS (1953) 
(cited in J. Agresto, supra note 17. at 128-29). 
71. J. AGRESTO, supra note 17, at 128-29. 
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the framers who were vocal on the subject expected the federal 
courts to exercise this power.72 Secondly, we know that the framers 
voted down (more than once) the suggestion that the Supreme 
Court share the President's veto power. Adding this vetoing group, 
labeled a Council of Revision, would have changed the Constitution 
in two ways: (1) judicial vetoing could have been done on any pol-
icy ground, not just the ground that the supreme law had been vio-
lated; and (2) judicial vetoes done in this manner would have been 
overrideable by two-thirds vote in Congress. Both of these were 
rejected at the Constitutional Convention. 73 
The Constitution's system of checks on the Court's interpret-
ing power gives one check to the hyper-majority----constitutional 
amendment-and several to the lawmaking majority: (1) the power 
over the size of the Court, (2) the power over new appointments to 
the Court-shared by the President and the Senate, (3) the power of 
impeachment for flagrant abuses, and (4) power to make exceptions 
to and regulations of the Court's jurisdiction. These are extremely 
blunt instruments, as Agresta's book stresses, and unsuitable for al-
tering particular unpopular Supreme Court decisions. 74 They also 
operate gradually, although, as Charles Black argues, not terribly 
gradually. (He calculated the average modern Supreme Court Jus-
tice's tenure to be about thirteen years, roughly as long, he noted, as 
two terms on the Federal Trade Commission.)7s These imprecise, 
unwieldy and gradualist mechanisms for channeling the Court's in-
terpretive choices, are all that the Constitution gives the elective 
branches who represent the lawmaking majority. One direct check 
on the Court, the lowering of judicial salaries, is of course expressly 
forbidden (article III, section 1). The only other check is the self-
restraint meant to stem from the oath taken by "all judicial officers" 
(article VI, section 3) "to support this Constitution." 
The framers deliberately chose to keep from the lawmaking 
majority any direct, precise power to overrule the Court; to limit 
their checks on the judiciary to very blunt, uncertain, and gradual 
techniques; and to have the primary constraint on the judiciary 
stem from its conscientious reading of the law. 76 This constitu-
72. I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 97-98, 109 (M. Far-
rand, ed. 1911); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 73, 76, 78, 93, 
298-99, 376. 440. For a more guarded assessment, see L. LEVY, JUDICIAL REVIEW, His-
TORY, AND DEMOCRACY: AN lNTRODI.JCTION, IN JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME 
COURT 1-42 (1967). 
73. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787. at 73-80, 298. Cf J. 
AGRESTO, supra note 17, at 134-35. 
74. J. AGRESTO, supra note 17, at 96-138. 
75. C. BLACK, supra note 27, at 179-81. 
76. Of course, if Congress disagreed with the Court's reading of one of its own statutes, 
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tional scheme would seem to be at odds with Agresto's view that 
Congress may deliberately flout judicial readings of the Constitu-
tion. The Constitution seems to go some lengths to attenuate the 
inevitable linkage between the political force of majority will and 
the outcome of Court decisions. This pattern of constitutional 
choices, then, would seem to militate against the quest for more 
precise political constraints on the Court's interpretive power. 
Alternatively, can the text of the Constitution be said in some 
manner to provide constraints on judicial power, the kind of con-
straints that Justice Black and John Ely sought there? Ely argues 
yes. His book defends the enhancing of an egalitarian, representa-
tive political process as the guideline-setting goal for judicial review, 
on the grounds not that this process is favored by Ely's own poli-
tical theory, but rather that it is the political theory implicitly en-
dorsed by the whole Constitution. 11 
The extratextualists can challenge Ely with the reminder that 
the text nonetheless includes clauses, like the privileges or immuni-
ties clause, that seem to license judges to roam all over the map of 
social policy, striking down any law they strongly feel to be 
wrong. 1s And Ely's books appears not to have an answer for them 
because it does not give an account of his own desire to find con-
straints in the text. 79 Yes, one can find them if one wants to con-
strain judicial discretion, but one can also find discretion-enhancing 
clauses if one sets out to look for them. 
In other words, Ely's argument is essentially as follows: the 
Constitution sets up a representative form of government; the 
Supreme Court is not a very representative body; so let's look for 
ways to constrain its discretion, so that Court power will be limited 
to enhancing the representative process. One could as easily argue a 
contrary view: the Constitution provides a series of checks on 
majoritarian, legislative power; the Supreme Court can provide 
such a check; so let's look for ways to enhance its discretion in or-
der to let it do more checking. I attempt in the text below to show a 
way to choose among these arguments. 
Congress could simply rewrite the law. To the extent that the Constitution implied a power 
of federal judicial review, however, it seems to create a deliberate distance between the law-
making majority and the Court, so that only the hyper-majority with Constitution·amending 
power can act directly and precisely to undo a Court decision. 
77. J. ELY, supra note 6, at 87-102. 
78. As I read Philip Bobbitt's defense of what he calls "ethical judicial review," it seems 
to match this description. SeeP. Bossrrr, supra note 45, at 93-177. 
79. His earlier essay, The Wages of Crying Wolf, did contain a hint for an answer: Roe 
v. Wade is "a very bad decision ... because it is bad constitutional law, or rather because it is 
not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be." Ely, supra 
note 39, at 947 (emphasis in original). His later book does not really follow up on this lead. 
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The answer to these extratextualist critics, as to why, in 
America, one ought to look for constraints on judicial discretion, is 
provided in some of Justice Black's opinions. His approach to the 
problem is more subtle than his deceptively simple rhetoric. When 
Black condemns his colleagues' more freewheeling reading of the 
due process clause, his opinions repeatedly appeal to the traditional 
distinction between legislative and judicial power (i.e., to the core of 
the old political question doctrine). He says that his opponents "ap-
propriate for this Court a broad power which we are not authorized 
by the Constitution to exercise." Their version "subtly conveys to 
courts, at the expense of legislatures, ultimate power over public 
policies in fields where no specific provision of the Constitution lim-
its legislative power." It might be used "to license this Court ... to 
roam at large in the broad expanses of policy and morals, and to 
trespass, all too freely, on the legislative domain." It is one thing 
for "courts proceeding within clearly marked constitutional bound-
aries ... to execute policies written into the Constitution. "so It is 
quite another matter for them to "roam at will in the limitless area 
of their own beliefs as to reasonableness and actually select policies, 
a responsibility which the Constitution entrusts to the legislative 
representatives of the people."s1 
The U.S. Constitution does, after all vest judicial power in the 
Supreme Court; it vests legislative power elsewhere. The framers 
consciously opted not to set up a Council of Revision, as they called 
it, or a Council of Elders as Arthur Miller calls it.B2 "Judicial 
power" did not necessarily mean (contra Raoul Berger)s3 a power 
limited to the narrowest possible reading of the specific, conscious 
original intent of the lawmaker, but it did mean a power to interpret 
some expression of the sovereign will. It is in the Constitution's 
division between legislative and judicial power that one can locate 
the obligation to seek constraints on judicial discretion, constraints 
that must be found in some textual expression, implicit or explicit, 
of the popular will. 
Some examples may clarify my meaning. There are many 
opaque phrases in the Constitution: due process of law, equal pro-
tection of the laws, the privileges or immunities of citizens, a repub-
lican form of government. The jurist exercising "judicial restraint" 
would be guided by the desire to displace as few popularly selected 
rules as possible. Thus, a Justice like Frankfurter would read "due 
80. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 70, 75, 90, 91-92 (Black, J., dissenting). 
81. !d. at 91 (quoting his own dissent from Federal Power Commission v. Pipeline Co., 
315 U.S. 575, 599, 601 n.4). 
82. See A. MILLER, supra note 46. 
83. See R. BERGER, supra note 15. 
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process" in a judicially self-restrained, but discretion-maximizing 
way: the clause permits whatever procedures are reasonable. This 
means most state-adopted procedures would be upheld, but the 
judge who becomes nauseated by such egregious measures as coer-
cive police-mandated stomach pumping can declare them unreason-
able.s4 Similarly, the self-restraintist might invoke what I would 
view as a distorted version (albeit an old one) of the political ques-
tion doctrine and declare certain clauses of the constitutional text, 
like "republican form of government," judicially unenforceable.ss 
The constraintist, on the other hand, would look to the consti-
tutional text itself for the suggested bounds of such concepts as 
"privileges or immunities of citizens" or "due process of law" or "a 
republican form of government." Tying "due process" to the crimi-
nal procedure outlined in the Bill of Rights might be one example, 
finding first amendment liberties to be part of the "privileges" of 
citizenship might be another. The constraintist, when faced with 
state legislative apportionment questions (instead of ducking them 
as the self-restraintists wanted to do), might try to be guided by 
section 2 of the fourteenth amendment (supplemented by the fif-
teenth and nineteenth) instead of ignoring it as the Court did.s6 
Equal protection is harder to elaborate in constraintist terms. 
One constraintist route is that of Justice Rehnquist who takes his 
guidance from the well-known historic background of the four-
teenth amendment and would consequently limit the clause to ra-
cial discrimination. Other constraintists might find that too narrow 
or too broad a reading. They might read in the history of the same 
text (e.g., the contemporaneous Freedmen's Bureau activities) a 
concern to ban only invidious racial discrimination, racial discrimi-
nation against out-groups.s7 Or, they may read in the textual his-
tory (specifically, the choice to employ broad language and to omit 
mentioning race or slavery) a broader concern about invidious prej-
udice against "discrete and insular minorities," or prejudice against 
relatively powerless groups whose distinctive traits were both acci-
dents of birth and unrelated to the primary goal of the legislation 
(e.g., statutes barring women from practicing law).ss 
In short, a judiciary determined to take the constitutional text 
seriously as a constraint on its own discretion would not necessarily 
84. Rochin, 342 U.S. 165. 
85. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) I. 
86. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 593-94 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
87. See Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 390-92, 396-98 (1978) (Marshall, J., separate 
opinion). 
88. Cf Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Bradwell v. Illinois. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 
(1873). 
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be an inactive judiciary. Nor would its decisions be mechanistically 
predictable in the format of a computer program. But it would be a 
judiciary that honored the Constitution's concern for separation of 
powers and for the ultimate sovereignty of the people.s9 
89. This separation of powers argument was anticipated by Thomas Grey when he 
launched the modem defense of extratextualism or "non-interpretivism" in 1975. He coun-
tered it by asserting that the case-by-case evolution of decision rules by judges is an "entirely 
traditional judicial task" of common law courts. And then he posed the rhetorical question: 
If common law development is an appropriate judicial function, falling within the 
traditionally accepted judicial role, is not the functionally similar case-by-case de-
velopment of constitutional norms appropriate as well? 
And he elaborated in a footnote his belief that common law judges are applying rather than 
making law: "The law in question consists of the generally accepted social norms applied in 
the decision of the cases, norms that are ... best seen as 'part of the law.' " Grey, Do We 
Have An Unwritten Constitution? supra note 41, at 715, n.48. His point is that the identifica-
tion and elaboration of consensual social norms, or customary judicial norms, has tradition-
ally been understood in the Anglo-American legal system as a legitimate part of the judge's 
function. 
Grey then went on to acknowledge a problem: "(T)he supremacy of constitutional law 
over legislation, when contrasted with the formally inferior status of common law, makes a 
great difference." But he insisted that court authority to override legislation on the basis of 
unwritten higher law is a question essentially separable from the question whether applying 
nonstatutory law to a case is a judicial function. And then he asserted, without claiming to 
prove, that the framers did intend this authority for the federal courts. Here is where Grey 
mistook the message of the Constitution. 
As W.W. Crosskey noted in the course of his extensive elaboration of the framers' under-
standing of the common law role of federal courts, to grant that the article III reference to 
"laws of the United States" included common law rulings does not entail granting that the 
courts' power of judicial review can make common law rights override statutory rights. I W. 
CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
622 (1952). 
